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The Social Science Imagination in India: 
Deconstructing Boundaries and Redefining Limits 
 
Krithika Srinivasan 
 
 
The social sciences have played a significant role in challenging and 
politicising various forms of exploitation. However, Indian social 
science discourse has largely ignored the exploitation that is inherent 
in most human–non-human relationships and, at times, even actively 
delegitimised any efforts to question the same. This paper tries to 
understand why the ethical aspects of human–non-human (specifically, 
animal) interactions have remained outside social science analysis. It 
does so by examining the arguments used to support such exclusion 
and by exploring a range of taken-for-granted differences between 
human and non-human animals. The analysis suggests that the 
reluctance of the Indian social sciences to engage with this question 
is unjustified. In doing so, it points to the need for social sciences to 
continually question the exclusionary power of their boundaries by 
deploying an empathetic and self-reflexive imagination.  
 
[Keywords: environmental ethics; non-human animals; politics of 
knowledge; speciesism; the social sciences in India] 
 
 
From the Sociological Imagination to the Social Science 
Imagination 
 
C. Wright Mills, in his classic 1959 text, makes a case for the 
‘sociological imagination’: a quality of mind that is necessary to 
understand society and social and personal phenomena. To Mills, the 
sociological imagination is a prerequisite for anyone seeking to make 
sense of life and the world, as it provides the ability to understand the 
interrelations between society and the individual, history and biography, 
and helps to ‘make clear the elements of contemporary uneasiness and 
indifference’ (1959: 13); to Mills, the sociological imagination is the 
The Social Science Imagination in India 23
‘capacity to shift from one perspective to another’ and will be the ‘major 
common intellectual denominator’ of the era (ibid.: 7, 14). Mills also 
contends that the sociological imagination has a critical role to play in 
the ‘intellectual and political tasks of social analysis’ (ibid.: 21) and in 
moving beyond the ‘pretentious mediocrity’ (ibid.: 20) that is seen in the 
social sciences.  
 Exploitation, violence, and injustice have long been a focus of social 
science inquiry, and the field has engaged with these themes in both 
descriptive and interventional/political manners (Latour 2005). As Satish 
Saberwal puts it, ‘the social sciences, including sociology, are double 
faced: on one side, these look for ways to understand “what things are 
like”; on the other, this understanding, it is hoped, would enable us to 
influence “what things ought to be like”’ (2004: 419). While to Saberwal 
and B. Latour, this dual role can pose difficulties, the involvement of the 
social sciences in challenging exploitation and hierarchies that legitimise 
marginalisation – to put it simply, in subaltern politics – has been and 
continues to be crucial (Baviskar 2008).  
 However, the social sciences themselves have played active and 
passive roles in perpetuating exploitation (Denzin and Lincoln 2005), 
and the social science imagination has often been slow to expand its 
‘frontiers of justice’, a term I borrow from Martha C. Nussbaum (2006). 
The social sciences started as studies of western societies, and gradually 
(reluctantly and otherwise) evolved to include that which was not 
previously considered as belonging to its domain – the concerns of 
women, transgender, and gay people, for instance. 
 In India, the modern social sciences were born during the colonial 
period, and served mostly to develop ‘cultural technologies to rule’ 
(Yadav 2006: 3847). After independence, the task of nation building 
helped set agendas for the field, and it was only much later that issues 
related to children, dalits, women, etc. entered its boundaries (Rao 1982; 
Chaudhuri 2003; Rege 2003). Surveys of research in sociology and 
social anthropology undertaken by the Indian Council for Social Science 
Research point to the expanding boundaries of the Indian social sciences; 
while the first two surveys (up to 1969 and 1969–1979) barely mention 
women or gender as groups/themes of social science study, the third 
survey (1980-87) has an entire chapter devoted to ‘women’s studies and 
women’s development’ (ICSSR 1972/1974, 1985, 2000). Sharmila Rege 
(2003) also describes a similar evolutionary process in Indian sociology 
with respect to women, and demonstrates how it was only in the 1980s 
that women’s studies became important. A survey of the Economic and 
Political Weekly shows the same trend – while the 13-year period from 
1966 to 1979 has only twenty-one papers on the subject of women, the 
Krithika Srinivasan 24
next five years (1980-85) see a proliferation (forty papers) of discussions 
on this subject (Ghosal 1997).  
 This paper suggests that there is a continued need for the Indian 
social sciences to question and push their boundaries. It does so by 
exploring an example of an exploitative relationship that continues to 
elude the imagination of modern social science in India despite its all-
pervasive presence – the human–non-human relationship.  
 
The Non-Human, ‘Social Facts’, and the Social Sciences 
 
While one plausible explanation for this absence could be that the social 
sciences are concerned with only human beings, and not the non-human, 
two factors compel us to rethink this reasoning. First, the history of the 
social sciences shows us that the intellectual community has over time 
played a key role in maintaining exploitation by deeming specific groups 
as being outside the purview of academic debate – by excluding them 
from ‘knowledge’ or the discipline. As N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln 
note in their discussion on disciplinary imaginaries, ‘the social sciences 
are normative disciplines, always already embedded in issues of value, 
ideology, power, desire, sexism, racism, domination, repression and 
control’ (2005: 13). Feminist literature points to the epistemological 
exclusion of women, and Michel Foucault (1998) has elaborated on the 
power-knowledge nexus. Second, it is important to recall Mills’ assertion 
that all social analysts who are ‘imaginatively aware of the promise of 
their work have consistently asked ... [w]hat is the structure of this 
particular society as a whole? What are its essential components, and 
how are they related to one another?’ (1959: 6). 
 It is an indisputable fact that society as a whole and human beings as 
individuals are constantly interacting with non-human life. Therefore, no 
attempt to understand human nature or social phenomena is going to be 
complete when these ‘essential components’ of human life are not 
engaged with seriously.1 This has been discussed before: for instance, 
Ramachandra Guha (1994) and M. Smith (2001) show that while the 
social sciences for long followed Emile Durkheim’s maxim that ‘social 
facts’ can be explained only by other ‘social facts’, the emergence of 
environmental concerns led to the recognition that there is a need to take 
into account the environment in which we live, of which we are a part. 
As Mills says, meaningful social science is contingent on the ability ‘to 
range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most 
intimate features of the human self – and to see the relations between the 
two’ (1959: 7). The social sciences, in order to fulfil their potential, 
should, therefore, at the very least, be critically analysing the ways in 
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which human beings relate to non-human Others, and uncovering the 
implications of these relationships for both ‘human nature’ and the ‘non-
human Other’.  
 It is in such a context that I survey the manners in which non-human 
beings, specifically non-human animals,2 have been ignored and, at 
times, even delegitimised, as a subject of social science scholarship in 
India, and deconstruct the assumptions and views that have possibly 
prevented the human–non-human life relationship from gaining 
legitimacy as a subject of academic contemplation. The paper points to 
the contradictions in and the lack of foundation for such views, and 
reminds that dominant social science discursive formations have often 
been implicated in processes of exploitation that are linked to such 
epistemological exclusion. While the particular case discussed in the 
paper is, for reasons of analytical simplicity, that of non-human animals, 
the core argument of the paper relates to social science boundaries and 
their exclusionary effects in general. The main objective of the paper is 
to question the seeming appropriateness and normality of accepted 
boundaries; therefore, despite the term ‘redefining’ in the title, it does not 
suggest new imaginative limits, as doing so would be antithetical to its 
purpose. Rather, it calls for a renewed Indian social science imagination 
that is engaged in a continual process of self-examination and 
redefinition, for only such a non-complacent and critical approach can be 
the foundation of a truly inclusive, dynamic, and progressive academic 
field.  
 
The Non-Human Animal and Indian Social Science 
 
Across the world, the human–non-human relationship is largely 
exploitative, and the situation is no different in India. As G. Elder et al. 
observe, while the legitimacy and acceptability of different types of 
human-animal relationships vary across cultures, what is remarkable is 
the ‘universality of human violence toward animals’ (1998: 87). Indian 
social science, however, has more or less excluded the non-human 
animal as a subject of concern (as different from an object of study) by 
both (i) ignoring and (ii) actively delegitimising its interests. That is, 
while the human–non-human relationship is considered in terms of its 
impacts on human interests, the impacts of the same relationship on the 
non-human is not included in mainstream social science inquiry.  
 
Absence 
 
The ignoring of the non-human animal is evidenced by its absence in 
social science literature. For example, surveys of the Sociological 
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Bulletin (1952–20083) and the Indian Social Science Review (1999–
20054) reveal a total lack of articles that engage with the non-human as a 
focus of concern. A search of the Economic and Political Weekly’s web 
archives (from 1999 onwards; keywords: ‘animal’, ‘environment’, ‘non-
human’, and ‘animal rights’) did offer a few exceptions (Samanta 2006; 
Srinivasan and Nagaraj 2007; Kothari 2009), but the overall evidence 
points to a highly anthropocentric scholarship. For example, the only 
article that answered to the term ‘animal rights’, begins on a balanced 
note calling for NGO and state programmes for the livelihood 
rehabilitation of communities that use performing animals such as 
dancing bears, but ends up concluding that the sight of children 
performing in bear costumes is ‘a poignant reminder of where the 
priorities of an animal rights campaign should lie’ (Radhakrishna 2007: 
4225; emphasis added). To give another instance, an editorial piece 
(EPW 2000: 1417) on zoos examines the proposed closure of the Nagpur 
zoo from a predominantly instrumental angle – it calls for the 
development of Indian zoos as the ‘[c]reative expansion of zoos provides 
an opportunity for creative education in ecology as well as a base for 
Indian science to contribute to the expanding knowledge base in zoology 
and conservation of forest and animal wealth’, completely bypassing the 
debates on the ethics of the same (Anderson 1998; Acampora 2005).  
 While there does exist some work on the ethics of human–non-
human relationships, this has often been a part of religious texts (for 
example, the Buddhist and Jaina texts), thus making it a matter for 
consumption by only the religiously inclined, especially in the context of 
a secular democracy. There is also an overlooking of secular scholarship 
that engages politically with the non-human animal: for example, 
Mohandas K. Gandhi’s vegetarianism and his condemnation of the use of 
animals in medical research in Hind Swaraj (1939: 59), Shiv Visva-
nathan’s discussion of theosophy’s critique of the use of animals in 
science (1997), and work in philosophy (such as Srivastava 2005) are 
rarely, if ever, discussed in mainstream social science research and 
education.  
 This is not to say that human–non-human relationships are not 
studied by Indian social science. Indian environmental social science has 
devoted much attention to this, but this has remained largely 
anthropocentric in concern, with the non-human treated largely as an 
object to be managed and distributed (for example, Shiva and Bandho-
padhyay 1991; Krishna 1996, 2004). Literature on environmental ethics 
and politics has been mainly centred on the ‘question of social justice, of 
allowing the poor to have as much claim in the fruits of nature as the 
powerful’ (Guha 2000: vi), or how environmental protection (or the lack 
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of it) affects human societies, and how we must ‘treat’ non-human life so 
as to ensure our own survival and wellbeing (for example, Shahabuddin 
et al. 2007). Indra Munshi’s review article on the ‘environmental 
concerns of social scientists in India’ (2000: 251) also indicates an 
overtly human-focused agenda, and she opines that an underexplored 
dimension is the human-nature relationship. There does exist literature 
on conservation (Singh 2003; Thapar 2003; Gadgil 2005; Guha 2007; 
Shahabuddin and Rangarajan 2007) that focuses on the concerns of the 
non-human, but this is restricted to charismatic and/or ecologically 
valuable, keystone species and biodiversity in general. In such literature, 
the emphasis is on the ecological and aesthetic benefits of conservation, 
and domestic or non-exotic animals are not accorded any importance. 
Even these positions, however, have remained marginal and are often 
delegitimised, as I shall show below. 
 
Illegitimacy 
 
While, at one level, the non-human animal is absent from social science 
discussion because of neglect and a heavy emphasis on solely human 
concerns, at another level, any academic or activist move to attend to the 
non-human animal has invited delegitimisation by mainstream academia 
in various forms. 
 The post-colonial era in India saw ‘fierce debates relating to the need 
for an indigenous approach vis-à-vis the importation and imitation of 
western paradigms’ of social science knowledge (Mukherji 2006: 175). 
While this trend has positively reshaped the contours of the social 
sciences, it has also been rather perversely used to stop any debate on the 
ethics of human–non-human animal relationships in India. Standard 
Indian social science literature, while discussing protection of non-
human nature, has often argued that these ideas are part of imposed 
western hegemony and neo-colonialism (for example, Agarwal 1994). 
Take the case of wildlife conservation,5 for instance. The practice of 
identifying protected areas for non-human animals is typically criticised 
(Baviskar 1997) as being a western and elite plot to deprive the Third 
World populace of their ‘natural resources’. In yet another instance of 
such a standpoint, Guha and J. Martinez-Alier say that ‘the initial 
impetus for setting up parks ... came from ... ex-hunters turned 
conservationists belonging mostly to the declining Indian feudal elite, 
and … international agencies ... seeking to transplant the American 
system of national parks on to Indian soil’, and that deep ecology’s 
emphasis on wilderness preservation ‘provides an impetus to the 
imperialist yearnings of Western biologists’ (1997: 95-96). 
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 Despite this distaste for the ‘western’ concern for the non-human 
animal, in sharp contrast, there is not much hesitation on the part of the 
Indian academia (or activist sector, for that matter) when it comes to 
importing concepts such as human rights, affirmative action, women’s 
rights, human development, etc. And, while the social sciences have 
repeatedly questioned the use of western concepts and frameworks to 
understand indigenous cultures, there is a readiness, as we shall see in the 
following section, to accept the use of human standards such as 
rationality to understand and value non-human animals (Wolch 1998). 
This is akin to saying that a human is of less value because he/she cannot 
find/see in the dark or does not have a sense of smell that is as keen as a 
dog’s. 
 The charge of elitism has constantly dogged any discourse that is 
protective of the non-human animal. For example, wildlife conservation 
is often seen as embodying the vested interests of urban elites (Vasan 
2005). To Amita Baviskar, ‘the Silent Valley power project promoted by 
the Government of Kerala – which was given up by the Centre because it 
threatened tropical rainforests – was an instance of the success of elitist 
environmentalism’ (1997: 196-7), and to Guha and Martinez-Alier 
‘Southern lovers of the wilderness come typically from patrician 
backgrounds’ (1997:19). This arises from the idea that only economically 
well-off people are concerned about non-human animals; while it is 
certainly true that people from the upper economic classes are the most 
visible in animal protection work and politics, what is not true is the 
inference that other sections of society are not sympathetic to non-human 
animals, even and especially non-charismatic ones such as street dogs. 
Anyone working in the field of animal welfare will agree that the poor 
are, in general, more generous in sharing their limited space and food 
with animals than well-off people.  
 Now it is true to an extent that only someone whose basic needs are 
already taken care of is likely to get involved in politics for another 
living being. But this fact is not peculiar to the non-human animal cause; 
if there are disadvantaged people found at the forefront of struggles 
around human marginalisation, it is because they have a personal stake in 
the discourse – the communities living in the Narmada Valley marched 
to Delhi and protested the Sardar Sarovar project only when they realised 
that they were losing their homes and livelihoods. And usually it is only 
the ‘elite’ who can afford to participate in such politics even though they 
do not have a personal stake.6 Baviskar (1997) points out that many 
grassroots social movements are based on the coming together of urban 
middle-class activists and the local affected populations. Medha Patkar 
and Aruna Roy are two examples. In the case of non-human animals, 
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those who have a personal stake – the non-human animals – cannot 
communicate in human language and are, therefore, not in a position to 
participate, just like infants and the cognitively challenged. This has the 
consequence that any political action carried out in their name has an 
‘elitist’ face.  
 There are other contradictions. While we condemn ‘inviolate’ spaces 
for wildlife (Shahabuddin et al. 2007), we support ‘inviolate’ spaces such 
as cities for human beings where tigers, monkeys, ‘stray’ dogs, and rats 
are not welcome, and are, in fact, killed, trapped, or chased out without 
question. Similarly, there is a strong trend in Indian social science 
discourse to actively (and rightly) support the rights of tribal groups over 
their ancestral lands (Gadgil and Guha 1992; Bhatia 2005). This position 
is based on the fact that these groups have historically lived on these 
lands and, therefore, as the original inhabitants, have far more claim over 
these regions than the state or colonial ‘masters’, and that they have been 
the victims of ‘historical injustice’ (Forest Rights Bill 2005, cf. Bhatia 
2005: 4891). But this position changes when it comes to non-human 
animals. Surely, non-human animals and plants have even more ancestral 
claim to the land than any human community? Why not consider them 
the victims of ‘historical injustice’ as well, and as having more claim 
over our cities and forests than their colonising masters – humans, in this 
case? 
 In India, an anti–non-human stance seems to be more or less built 
into the psyche of the progressive social scientist. One common 
argument is that India, being a country with a large and poor human 
population, cannot afford to expend time and resources on concerns of 
the non-human, as Baviskar (1997) describes in her survey of Indian 
environmental social science. This implies that concern and politics for 
one issue/group requires the dismissal of other issues/groups as illegiti-
mate and unimportant. By the same logic, scholars/activists concerned 
with women’s issues should dismiss caste-related discrimination as 
irrelevant, and those working on caste exploitation should consider 
action against child abuse a waste of time.  
 An anti-non-human stance also stems from the mistaken conflation 
of meat politics with caste-class politics. The animal becomes a pawn in 
sectarian politics, and any pro-animal discourse is immediately decried 
on the grounds that it implies an elitist, casteist, and non-secular 
vegetarianism. Meat eating is widely seen as a progressive act in India 
because vegetarianism is associated with Hindu upper-caste eating 
practices. As Kancha Ilaiah puts it, ‘Vegetarian’ is a synonym for 
‘Brahmin’ (1996: 68). 
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 There is an element of truth to this because Hindutva political 
lobbies and their demand for bans on cow slaughter have come to be 
associated with vegetarianism (Ahmad 2005). This association of non-
human animal politics with Hindutva ideology and politics has arguably 
been exacerbated by the affiliation of India’s only animal activist-
politician, Maneka Gandhi, with the Bharatiya Janata Party. This, and the 
charge of elitism discussed earlier, have the consequence that non-human 
animal politics is often seen as violating the culture and dietary habits, 
and destroying the livelihoods of, marginalised communities (Ahmad 
2005; Radhakrishna 2007). For example, J. Jayalalitha’s (the then Chief 
Minister of Tamil Nadu) 2003 ban on animal sacrifice in temples by 
invocation of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act was 
interpreted and opposed by ‘secularists … as a step towards 
homogenising existing Hinduisms in the image of Brahminism’, leading 
to the repeal of the ban (Pandian 2005: 2313).  
 However, to conclude from such unfortunate connections that all 
animal ethics and politics is linked to caste-class hegemony is factually 
incorrect. And to ignore the obvious violence and suffering involved in 
the ways we use non-human animals and to legitimise their exploitation 
in the name of countering discrimination is a careless response in the 
Indian academia. For example, I. Ahmad asserts that, in a pluralistic 
society, meat-based food habits ought not to be challenged because 
pluralism is the ‘coexistence with more or less tension in the same social 
space of many systems of global convictions and of the communities 
who produce them’ (2005: 4979). But do we defend the caste system, 
devadasi dedication, human sacrifice, purdah (forced seclusion of 
women), or genital mutilation while upholding cultural rights, traditional 
livelihoods, or pluralism? Even polygamy is increasingly being seen as 
unacceptable (Engineer 2004).  
 Furthermore, a truly ethical standpoint can never be based on 
meaningless bans on cow slaughter,7 but would rather imply a vegan 
lifestyle, one that avoids milk, deerskin, and ghee – which are the 
cornerstones of Brahmanical rituals and eating habits – and one that 
shuns violence of any kind, including towards humans. In addition, it 
must be emphasised that it is not marginal communities who are the most 
implicated in animal exploitation and abuse; rather, the higher an 
individual on the economic ladder, the greater her/his harmful impacts on 
non-human animals, say, for example, due to increased access to medical 
technologies, leather shoes, silk clothes, or simply higher levels of 
consumption. Therefore, discourses that are truly pro-animal can never 
be anti-poor or anti-minority in a communitarian sense. It is the actions 
and relationships that are critiqued, and not the communities.  
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 One other common dismissal tactic is to relegate human-animal 
relationships to the domains of emotions and morality. This is made 
evident by recourse to the derogatory appellation ‘animal lover’ 
(Balasubrahmanyan 1991: 2860) or ‘wilderness lover’ (Guha and 
Martinez-Alier 1997: 19). Love is an emotion, and U. Narayan points out 
that ‘emotions have always been regarded as totally opposed to reason 
and as always impediments to knowledge’ (1988: 32). Similarly, moral 
arguments in favour of the non-human animal are not regarded as being 
acceptable because morality is seen as not conducive to cultural 
pluralism (Kumar 2006). We forget that social justice is an equally 
morality-laden concept when we delegitimise animal ethics as non-
progressive morality. Another position is that the human–non-human 
animal relationship is a matter for the personal domain – it is not a 
political issue – as is evidenced by arguments for cultural relativism in 
the context of human-animal relationships. In saying this, we forget the 
hard won success of feminist theory and politics in establishing that the 
personal is political. Of course, it still may be argued that only human 
beings ‘make’ the political, as only they can participate in it, but such an 
argument would imply that non-participants like children or the mentally 
challenged would have to be excluded from the ‘political’ domain along 
with non-human animals. 
 
The Exclusionary Politics of Social Science Knowledge 
 
Before going on to the politics of knowledge, let us look at one simple 
example of how the Indian social sciences are limiting themselves 
because of the exclusion of the non-human as a subject of concern. 
Hydroelectric and other mega development projects have been the 
subject of much debate and critique in the Indian social sciences 
(Parasuraman and Cernea 1999; Khagram 2004). While much attention is 
given to the impacts on the local communities that are displaced, impacts 
on non-human animals is limited to an analysis of ‘environmental’ costs 
and long-term environmental damage. What is ignored is that while the 
human inhabitants of the area, on paper at least, are entitled to 
resettlement, the non-human animals have no choice but to drown in the 
rising waters. The few that manage to flee are killed when they enter 
human settlements because they are seen encroaching ‘inviolate’ human 
settlements and posing a threat to human well-being. Despite this, there 
is absolutely no discussion at all of resettling and rehabilitating the non-
human victims of development projects. At the most, compensatory 
measures such as afforestation are recommended, but of what use are 
these to the individuals that suffer and die as a result of the project? So, 
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here, we have an instance of how inquiry into an issue is incomplete 
because the non-human animal is not taken into consideration.  
 While addressing issues related to exploitation, the social sciences 
have discussed the manner in which dominant knowledge bodies 
maintain power structures and contribute to the devalorisation of sub-
altern groups. Foucault has ‘demonstrated how power is woven into all 
aspects of social and personal life, pervading [even the] social sciences’ 
(Kattakayam 2006). To Foucault, ‘all forms of “knowledge” and “truth” 
are merely the triumphant version of events that has succeeded in 
emerging from the perpetual struggle of ideas and ideologies that 
characterise our way of interacting’ (Downing 2008: 13).  
 Feminist theory (Ferguson 1994; Alcoff 2000) has also shown that 
women have been systematically marginalised by the intellectual 
community through a subtle process of deeming them unworthy of 
academic concern, by devaluing their cognitive patterns and modes of 
knowledge, and by keeping them away from the focus of theory in 
general – the process of epistemological exclusion, which to Arjun 
Appadurai (2000), is linked to social exclusion. It is typically dominant 
social groups that are involved in the development of mainstream 
knowledges that are portrayed as objective and universal, and the 
academic marginalisation of a particular group can usually be traced to 
the vested interests of the ‘knower’ (who seeks to protect his/her own 
interests). For example, the colonial project was justified and driven by 
dominant knowledge bodies like colonial anthropology and Orientalism. 
 The situation is similar with respect to human–non-human animal 
relations. The discursive formation of the social sciences is constructed 
by the dominant group (human beings, the ‘knowers’) and consequently 
excludes (deliberately or by omission) non-human animals (the potential 
‘knowns’) from the focus of inquiry. This exclusion is achieved by 
means of a variety of arguments, some of which have been reviewed 
above. All these arguments, however, seem to be based on an a priori 
underlying assumption that non-human animals do not matter as much as 
humans, that their lives and well-being are not as important, except in an 
instrumental sense as conveyed by the idea of sustainable development 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). This is 
evident in M. Radhakrishna’s examination of performing bear rescue, 
where she suggests that even while the efforts to protect animals are 
appreciated, the negative impacts these have on the human users of these 
animals mean that ‘public debate is necessary to discuss the lengths to 
which animal rights campaigns can and should go’ (2007: 4224; 
emphasis added).  
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 Only the abovementioned assumption permits the otherwise 
inconsistent arguments that dismiss concern for non-human animals as 
western, elitist, casteist, non-secular, emotional, moralistic, and 
irrelevant in general. This assumption is so deeply entrenched in our 
collective consciousness that there is practically no discussion at all in 
the Indian social sciences of its origins or validity. What are the beliefs 
about non-human animals that give rise to this assumption? How valid 
are they, both in terms of facticity and as criteria for ethical and political 
decision-making? How can we understand these beliefs in the light of the 
general nature of the human- non-human animal relationship and what 
we have learnt from historical precedents?  
 
Difference, Exploitation, and Exclusion 
 
It is possible that the social sciences have ignored the concerns of non-
human animals because they are widely perceived as being different 
from and, therefore, inferior to human beings and, in turn, not worthy of 
ethical consideration. As the animal ethics literature points out, humans 
and non-human animals are commonly seen as differing on the following 
axes: sentiency; language; consciousness/self-awareness, intentionality 
and rationality; and moral agency (Armstrong and Botzler 2003; Garner 
2004; Francione 2008).  
 
Human-Animal Difference Revisited 
 
The simplest definition of sentiency is the ability to feel physical 
sensations such as pain and/or emotions such as fear (DeGrazia 2003). 
René Descartes held that animals are not sentient and are mere 
automatons, like machines (Rollin 2003a). There is now, however, 
evidence to suggest that non-human animals experience pain8 and 
suffering like humans (Armstrong and Botzler 2003; Garner 2004). 
Nevertheless, there are views that only ‘higher’ animals suffer (Bermond 
2003) or that there are differences in levels of sentiency and the less 
sentient the non-human, the fewer are our ethical obligations to them, 
because they are believed not to suffer ‘as much’ (Silverman 2008). This 
is used to justify the use of animals in scientific experiments (and also 
for other purposes such as food, clothing, accessories, and labour). 
 Pain in animals is studied by identifying physiological and 
behavioural responses/correlates to painful stimuli that are similar to 
those found in humans. For example, endorphins, serotonin, enkephalins, 
and endogenous opiates are secreted in both humans and animals in 
response to painful stimuli, and similar anaesthetics and analgesics are 
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effective for pain control in both (Rollin 2003a). The behavioural 
responses to pain are remarkably similar (for example, human and rat 
responses to electric shocks are alike) as are the morphological structures 
involved in pain mechanisms, especially in vertebrates and cephalopods 
(Varner 2003). Pain also has the same evolutionary function in humans 
and animals, and that is to avoid harm and death.  
 The arguments of those who deny animal suffering are based on the 
fact that, in humans, pain correlates are sometimes seen even in the 
absence of the experience of pain, like in the case of spinal cord damage 
or alexithymia (an emotional disorder) (Bermond 2003). It is also argued 
that similar neuroanatomical structures do not necessarily mean similar 
functions, as these could have altered during evolution (ibid.). The basic 
position of such arguments is that even though there are similarities in 
pain mechanisms, there is a possibility that these do not reflect similar 
emotional experiences. As B. Bermond opines, a rat walking over a hot 
plate (an electric stove) to get to food does not necessarily mean that it 
has experienced intense hunger; to him, such a conclusion is only an 
‘anthropomorphic projection’ (ibid.: 84) Such arguments are based on 
exceptions/abnormalities in human experiences (not the rule), and do not 
by any means establish that non-human animals do not experience pain. 
As Bermond himself notes, pain can be studied directly only in humans, 
because only they can be asked whether they have feelings, and 
agnosticism about animal pain, as I shall argue below, is made possible 
because humans and animals cannot communicate adequately.  
 The measurement of pain and suffering has always been a difficult 
task as it is accepted that pain is subjective (Jennings et al. 2009). While 
there are several physiological and observational measures of pain, self-
reports are ‘considered the gold standard of pain measurement’ (Strong 
et al. 2002: 126). This brings us to the question of how, given that we do 
not share a language with animals and, therefore, cannot elicit self-
reports from them, it is possible to conclude that they suffer less or do 
not suffer, particularly when there is physiological and observational 
evidence that they do experience pain. By the same logic, we should be 
agnostic about pain experience in other humans (including infants) with 
whom we do not share a language. If we do believe that humans who do 
not share a language with us feel pain, it is because we project our own 
mental experiences onto them (Rollin 2003b). What grounds do we have 
to dismiss the same projection when it comes to non-human animals 
then? 
 Moving on to language, there is a lot of disagreement about how it 
distinguishes humans from non-human animals (Sorabji 1993; Singer 
and Kuhse 2002). There is one view that only humans have language, 
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whereas other views that see language as a system of signs hold that 
language is common to all animals, while syntax is what is peculiar to 
human beings (Sorabji 1993). Here again, a fundamental problem is the 
simple fact that humans do not share a mode of communication with 
other animal species that is adequate for the sharing of grammatical 
profundities. Therefore, the conclusion that they don’t have language is 
very shaky indeed; all that can be said with certainty is that they don’t 
have language or syntax as humans know it.  
 What about questions of consciousness, rationality, and intentionality? 
(Sorabji 1993; Singer and Kuhse 2002; Garner 2004). Consciousness is 
understood as the ability to be self-aware, form abstract concepts, plan 
ahead, and deal effectively with new situations, and there is a great deal 
of variation in views about consciousness in non-human animals 
(Dawkins 2003). With respect to rationality, the predominant view is that 
non-human animals do not possess reason and most ‘rational’ behaviours 
of non-human animals are dismissed on the grounds that they are mere 
physical adaptations, while the same/similar behaviour in humans is an 
‘act of reason’ (Sorabji 1993). For example, a mother rat shifting her 
young ones to a safer location when the nest is disturbed is explained as 
merely biological and instinctual. It is held that only humans actually 
possess these qualities in a manner that is more than biological and, 
therefore, superior or of more value. But, despite the use of various 
measures to assess such mental qualities (Dawkins 2003; Griffin 2003), 
conclusions are ultimately based on the inability of non-human animals 
to prove or report to us that they do have these qualities (just like we 
cannot prove or report to them that we have these qualities). We know 
that most humans possess consciousness and rationality as we are able to 
share these ideas with each other. But, given that humans and non-human 
animals cannot share such concepts, it is unreasonable to conclude that 
they do not possess such traits. 
 Another related argument is that, since humans think about and 
anticipate pain, the future and death, their lives are of more value (Singer 
2001). But this takes us back to the question, how can we be certain that 
non-human animals do not think? And even if they cannot, would the 
argument (Singer and Kuhse 2002) hold that since babies and mentally 
challenged people do not possess the capacity to anticipate, to use 
language, and to reason like other human beings, we are justified in using 
them as a ‘resource’? 
 It is held that non-human animals are not moral agents and, 
therefore, are not worthy of moral consideration (Francione 2008). This 
argument not only ignores much evidence to the contrary (Bekoff 2007), 
but also forgets that it is widely accepted that we have moral obligations 
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to human beings who are not moral agents – for example, cognitively 
challenged people or infants. It also overlooks one of the grounds used to 
justify colonialism and slavery – the moral underdevelopment or 
‘deceitful’ nature of the ‘Other’ races (Sahay 2007: para 2). 
 The exploitation of non-human animals is also justified on the 
grounds that since non-human animals are lesser beings on account of 
the differences described above, our abuse of them can be explained as 
being ‘natural’ rather than ‘social’ (Rollin 2003a). When human beings 
exploit other species, it is deemed to be a ‘natural’ (and morally 
excusable) phenomenon and, therefore, not a matter for social science 
critique. However, when humans exploit each other on account of caste, 
class, race, or gender differences, it becomes an act of injustice – the 
consequence of ‘social hierarchies’; a phenomenon that is worthy of 
entering the social science imagination. This line of reasoning is 
reminiscent of a time not too long ago when exploitation of non-white 
people was justified as ‘natural-normal-right’ because of ‘natural’ 
differences between races like the inferior intelligence and moral 
depravity of colonised peoples. 
 
Lessons from History on Difference-based Exploitation 
 
Insofar as it is just a listing of differences, no real problem exists. An 
inherently flawed leap of logic occurs when we use these perceived 
differences to make ethical judgments (Sorabji 1993; Alessio 2008). 
Difference, as feminist theory has argued, is not valid grounds for 
exploitation (Alcoff 2000). 
 Over the centuries, exploitative relationships have been legitimised 
by the construction of hierarchies based on perceived differences among 
the constituent groups (Alessio 2008). While such hierarchies manifest 
themselves in varied and intricate ways, what is often common to them9 
is that they are constructed by dominant groups through a systematic 
process of devalorisation that assigns inferior value to aspects of real or 
imagined difference in the subaltern group, thus legitimising their control 
and utilisation as a ‘resource’. For example, the non-white races were 
deemed to be intellectually and morally inferior, dalits were supposed to 
have been ‘born’ lesser people, and non-human animals are supposed to 
lack the ability to reason considered ‘unique’ to human beings. White 
ethnic groups used the non-white races as a resource for physical labour, 
upper-caste groups used dalits as a resource for carrying out tasks that 
they did not want to do, and humans use non-human animals as a ‘natural 
resource’ to further human personal and economic well-being.  
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 It is now recognised that criteria used to identify exclusionary 
difference are based on concepts created by the dominant group and are 
often not relevant to the devalorised group; and ‘those who start from a 
position of social control have the advantage of creating, defining, and 
applying the key concepts that ultimately determine [inclusion and 
exclusion]’ (ibid.: 72). In the context of intra-human differences, IQ 
(intelligence quotient) scores, for instance, ‘have no real meaning when 
used to compare groups .... [as they] ... are used to compare out-groups 
with the dominant in-group that created the IQ test’ (ibid.: 71). Similarly, 
rationality, language and so on, have no real meaning when used to make 
moral judgments about non-human animals as they are all concepts that 
are created by the dominant group – humans – and based on human 
standards (Wolch 1998). 
 I would like to suggest that the adherence of the social sciences to 
the wider societal assumption that non-human animals are inferior and 
not worthy of ethical consideration is linked to a conscious or 
unconscious subscription to the hierarchies outlined above. While the 
social sciences have often questioned the ‘objectivity’ of the natural 
sciences (Haraway 1991), in this case, they have easily accepted the 
shaky (and oft-questioned) verdict that animals are inferior beings 
because of the various differences discussed above.  
 What is disregarded is that not only have many of these assumptions 
been debunked (Garner 2004; Francione 2008) but also that most of 
these differences (such as language, rationality) are not relevant criteria 
for ethical judgment. What does matter is that there is much reason to 
believe that they suffer – for moral concern, as we know it, presupposes 
the ability to feel and suffer (Rollin 2003a). As Jeremy Bentham 
famously said, what is important is not whether ‘Can they reason? nor 
Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ (1789: 325) 
 Furthermore, it is important to remind ourselves again that 
mainstream knowledge bodies have historically been implicated in 
difference-based exploitation. Edward Said describes how Orientalism is 
a system of knowledge that portrayed  
 
the Orient in terms of Western desires or Occidental notions of history, 
nature, culture, religion, society, man, rationality, etc., and represented it in 
terms of contrasting typologies within which inferior characters are 
attributed to the Orient: the vibrant Occidental man versus the sluggish 
Oriental, the scientific-rational Westerner versus the gullible-erratic 
Easterner, and the honest whites versus the deceitful non-whites…[and] 
[b]y setting up a binary of difference … established a dominant and 
systematic discourse for describing, teaching and ruling the Orient’ (Sahay 
2007: paras 2 and 3).  
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The parallels in the case of human–non-human animal relationships are 
evident. Therefore, it is important that the Indian social sciences are 
cognisant of this and deploy their critical-political role to its fullest.  
 
A Case for Deeper Insight and Continuing Inclusiveness 
 
Here is a question to the Indian social science academia: why are we so 
hesitant to engage with the morally questionable ways in which we relate 
to non-human animals? Is this because of some kind of basal fear that 
espousing such issues, that allowing them to enter the social science 
imagination, would threaten our known ways of life and our stable 
world? Or does it stem from the fear of being ridiculed as an elite 
‘animal lover’? Why is the debate on the moral status of non-humans 
constantly delegitimised? 
 
Including the Non-human Animal 
 
The explanation that our attitudes and actions towards the non-human are 
a manifestation of the ‘survival of the fittest’ does not fit well with the 
fact that while we invoke nature’s ‘inherent bloodiness’ in justifying our 
exploitation of other species, we simultaneously set ourselves apart by 
claiming that the human is superior because he/she is more than biology 
and instinct. Furthermore, while it is impossible to deny the instinctual 
urge of the individual (human or non-human) to first protect the interests 
of the self (and immediate family), the use of the self-interest or self-
defence arguments to legitimise institutional and large-scale exploitation 
of and violence towards other species is unjustifiable. In intra-human 
relationships too, self-defence is an acceptable argument in law for 
violence against the direct perpetrator of an attack against the individual. 
But large-scale violence and genocide is not (and should never be) 
considered legitimate.  
 R.D. Ryder notes that one common question is ‘Isn’t it natural to be 
speciesist?’ (1989: 7). Biology tells us the supposition that natural 
selection takes place because ‘it is good for the species’ is incorrect, and 
that ‘species as an entity does not answer to selection’ (Mayr 1997: 
2092). Based on this, I would like to suggest that ‘species’ is a 
constructed concept specific to the human imagination, and that other 
animals do not behave so as to benefit the ‘species’. Their locus of 
concern is the individual (and immediate family). This is similar to the 
notion of human rights, where the concern is ultimately for the individual 
human. Therefore, it is not natural to be speciesist.  
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 As has been discussed in the paper, it is difficult to conclude that 
non-human animals are inherently inferior and, even if we do so, this 
would only be even stronger reason to act towards them using high moral 
standards. It is precisely for voiceless groups like the cognitively 
challenged, children, and non-human animals that the critical-political 
role of the social science imagination becomes very significant. 
 It is possible to argue that there is no point in delving into these 
debates because the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals 
are too deeply entrenched to change. To this, it is Gandhi who provides 
an answer in Hind Swaraj. In the context of a discussion on how 
machinery has ‘impoverished India’, he says that the important thing is  
 
to realize that machinery is bad. We shall then be able gradually to do 
away with it. Nature has not provided any way whereby we may reach a 
desired goal all of a sudden. If, instead of welcoming machinery as a boon, 
we should [sic] look upon it as an evil, it would ultimately go’ (Gandhi 
1939: 93, see also 96-97).  
 
 Similarly, with respect to human–non-human relationships, the social 
sciences need to first recognise and challenge their ethically questionable 
nature, for without this first step, nothing can follow. A. Kothari offers a 
more direct argument, saying that while alternative, more benign ways of 
relating to other species may be referred to as ‘romantic’ or ‘impractical’, 
they are ‘no more impractical than trying to achieve universal human 
welfare through industrialisation of any kind’ (2009: 77).  
 History tells us that the field of social sciences has grown by 
expanding its boundaries to include previously excluded groups – from 
being a field that was focused on the interests of only the white male, to 
one that now includes the concerns of a much wider range of races, 
genders, and social groups. History also tells us that these groups were 
earlier excluded on the grounds that they were not of any significance to 
this field, just like how it is now held that non-human animals are not a 
relevant or legitimate subject of social science inquiry and politics. As A. 
Clarke notes, ‘power operates to create silences and gaps, and the sins of 
omission in ... the social sciences ... have been profound’ (2005: 76). The 
capacity to be sensitive to precedents and patterns, and engage with them 
in early stages, is extremely crucial for the social sciences. With respect 
to the human–non-human relationship, it is very clear that certain themes 
that have been identified in discourses around other forms of exploitation 
are repeating. For instance, the ease with which we use the term ‘animal 
lover’ to dismiss arguments that challenge human superiority and animal 
exploitation is, in a sense, an outright denial of the civil liberties 
discourse and the struggles that were undergone to shed the label ‘nigger 
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lover’. Therefore, a truly self-reflexive and self-critical discipline would 
be cautious when it comes to dismissing injustice in human–non-human 
relationships – and consequently making the non-human animal 
‘abuseable’ and ‘killable’ (Haraway 2008).  
 
An Empathetic Imagination 
 
By examining and critically deconstructing some common arguments 
related to human–non-human animal difference and the politics of 
knowledge, this paper has sought to establish that the Indian social 
sciences are not justified in ignoring and/or excluding non-human beings 
as subjects of concern. In so doing, it points to the need for Indian social 
science to recognise the often arbitrary (and yet deeply political) nature 
of its boundaries. While the paper has non-human animals as its 
analytical focus, the overall arguments are relevant to social science 
boundaries in general and the processes of inclusion/exclusion that they 
are implicated in. The example of non-human animals just goes to show 
how easily the social sciences can overlook, exclude, and dismiss 
without being aware of the inconsistencies in, lack of foundation for, and 
ethical problems with such positions.  
 While the paper dwelt on non-human animals, a re-specification of 
imaginative limits to include certain groups and not others, would be at 
cross purposes with the more fundamental point this paper seeks to 
make. And that is the need for the social sciences to be self-reflexive and 
critically self-aware, and be constantly engaged in a process of 
examining orthodoxies and boundaries that perpetuate its involvement in 
the reproduction of exploitative relationships. The role of the social 
science imagination becomes crucial where perceived differences are the 
greatest, and when exploitation is legitimised on such bases. It is my 
contention that the exclusionary and hegemonic impacts of such 
differences are the most severe when the degree of communication 
between the differing groups is minimal, as we saw in the discussions 
about reason, sentience, language, and the charge of elitism in preceding 
sections of the paper. And it is when communication, and consequently 
participation, is a limiting factor that a sensitive, empathetic imagination 
has a valuable part to play in questioning exclusionary boundaries. 
Therefore, for Indian social science to be the progressive field it seeks to 
be, it should guard against complacency about the rightness of its 
boundaries, and must heed Mills’ call for a self-aware imagination that 
provides the space for multiple perspectives – human and non-human; 
Self and Other; Us and Them.10 
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Notes 
 
1. I thank Sundar Sarukkai for pointing this out to me. 
2. I use the term non-human animals to emphasise that the human is a subset of 
‘animal’. 
3. Issues missed: 1960 Vol. 9 (1); 1988 Vol. 37. 
4. Issues missed: 2000 Vol. 2 (1); 2003 Vol.5 (2). 
5. I must clarify here that I am not defending the manner in which conservation is 
currently practised in India; I am only trying to point to the need to go beyond 
existing polarisations in the debate. 
6. There may be cases in which disempowered people from different areas gather to 
present a united front on an issue even if the issue at hand does not affect all of them 
immediately; but even in such cases, it is the knowledge that they could face (or have 
faced or are facing) a similar threat that spurs such participation. 
7. These bans augment animal suffering because when the cattle outlive their 
‘productive’ lives, they are transported in the most deplorable conditions to states 
where such slaughter is allowed. 
8. As Garner points out, ‘awareness of pain is functional for survival since animals can 
take steps to avoid it. It makes evolutionary sense, therefore, to impute sentiency to 
human and non-human animals, whereas it does not for plants who do not have the 
capacity to escape from harm’ (2004:11-12). 
9. Of course, power structures and hierarchies without any underlying construction of 
difference do exist, say, for instance, hierarchies that are imposed by brute force. 
10. The idea for this paper emerged during the Summer School for Philosophy (2007) 
organised by the Centre for Philosophy, National Institute of Advanced Studies, 
Bangalore. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer, N. Jayaram, Sundar Sarukkai, 
Rajesh Kasturirangan, Vijay K. Nagaraj, and Geoffrey Tan for their feedback.  
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